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The International Monetary Fund (IMF, or the Fund) has been uninterruptedly providing 
concessional financing to low-income countries since 1976. This financing has been 
channelled practically in its entirety under the same financial instrument, namely a voluntary 
participation trust fund that is separate from IMF finances, but managed by the latter. The 
programmes financed with these resources have progressively focused on macroeconomic 
stabilisation, the signalling of reforms and attracting other aid, as part of a poverty-reduction 
strategy that should be led by the borrower country. In 2009, the IMF overhauled its 
concessional financing policy: it incorporated new credit facilities, with a similar design to 
that of its ordinary facilities; it boosted the blending of concessional and ordinary resources 
for those countries with access to both types of financing; and it staggered the cost of the 
financing against a background of very low interest rates. Throughout 2018, the IMF will 
again review the concessional financing toolkit available to low-income countries, based on 
the experience built up in recent years. This article provides a framework for assessing the 
ongoing review.
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The author of this article is Xavier Serra Stecher of the Associate Directorate General International Affairs.
The IMF is made up of 189 member countries. Close to 40% of these are low-income 
countries, whose population – at the aggregate level – accounts for 15% of the population 
of all the members. The voting power of these countries in the IMF’s decision-making 
bodies is 5%, and their relative economic weight, measured by GDP, around 2.5% of the 
total (see Table 1).
In addition to performing its traditional functions1, the IMF engages in specific activities 
aimed at the group of low-income countries. In particular, since 1976 it has financed 
programmes for growth and poverty-reduction under concessional arrangements (with 
subsidised interest rates, and relatively long grace periods and maturities); since 1996 it 
has forgiven the debt incurred by countries that accredit their over-indebtedness and 
pursue ad hoc programmes; and since 2005 it has supported the implementation of 
programmes without financing for supervisory and signalling purposes (see Box 1).
The weight of the IMF’s concessional financing in the context of development aid is modest 
compared with that of the financial assistance provided by Governments, Multilateral 
Development Banks (MDBs) and other official and private creditors. Nor is the 
concessionality2 — or the grant element — of lending particularly high, since it normally 
stands below 35%, the level considered the benchmark for this type of loan. Internally, 
concessional financing does not have a weight equivalent to that of the IMF’s ordinary 
financing either: concessional lending accounts for around 12% of the IMF’s total credit at 
present (see Chart 1).
The role of the IMF in this area is, moreover, the subject of controversy among those 
advocating that it should fully abandon concessional financial assistance, at one extreme, 
and those in favour of it deploying tasks proper to an MDB – a status the institution neither 
has nor pursues – at the other extreme.3 Notwithstanding, the role played by the IMF with 
low-income countries4 and its financial function, in particular, have progressively gained in 
significance and complexity over time (see Box 2). Moreover, the IMF actively participated 
in the financing of the Millennium Development Goals (MDG) during the period 2000-2015, 
within the United Nations Organisation (UNO) framework, and it is committed to the Addis 
Ababa Action Agenda (AAAA) for the attainment of the Sustainable Development Goals 
(SDG) during the period 2015-2030.5
Introduction
1  The IMF supervises the economic and financial activity of all its members bilaterally, regionally and multilaterally, 
it grants financing under market conditions intended for crisis prevention and crisis resolution, it has non-
financial programmes and it provides technical assistance and advice in its areas of expertise to members so 
requesting it.
2  Concessionality, expressed as a percentage, is usually calculated as the relative deviation between the nominal 
loan value and the present value of the debt service of that loan, discounted at a market interest rate. As regards 
Official Development Assistance (ODA), a loan extended to a least developed country (LDC) and other low-
income countries (LIC) is considered concessional if the grant element, thus defined, exceeds 45%.
3  This debate became weightier with the IMF’s backing of the Millennium Declaration in 2000. The recommendation 
by the Meltzer Commission [Meltzer Report (2000)] that the IMF should discontinue the granting of long-term 
loans intended to reduce poverty and other similar ends illustrates how radical this discussion is. Lombardi 
(2005) briefly sets this debate in context.
4  IMF (2004 and 2008) provides the Fund’s own institutional view.
5  See Garrido et al. (2016) on the achievement of the MDG, the launch of the SDG and the AAAA on Development 
Financing.
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Currently, the prospects of improvement for the economies of the low-income countries in 
the medium term are moderately optimistic: the IMF estimates that around 30 of these 
countries, somewhat less than half those comprising the group, will cease to meet the 
conditions for IMF concessional lending eligibility within two decades. That means that 
they will have raised their income above the poverty threshold in place at that time6, or will 
have access to international financial markets in an ongoing and substantial way, and they 
will not have to withstand serious vulnerabilities, especially debt, in the short term. The 
path ahead, however, is long and uncertain.
During 2018, the IMF will review the lending toolbox available to these countries. This article 
examines the current status of and outlook for the IMF’s concessional financing. First, it considers 
the basic characteristics of the IMF’s concessional lending. Next, it analyses the structure and 
functioning of the trust fund from which this type of financing is channeled. Thereafter, it briefly 
assesses the IMF’s lending policy with low-income countries, and concludes with some 
considerations on the immediate and future course of the IMF’s concessional lending.
Currently, 69 IMF members – low-income countries, relatively underpopulated countries, 
and micro-States – can receive concessional financing.7 The list of beneficiaries has 
progressively changed in accordance with a formal qualifying framework, which is 
Main characteristics  
of the IMF’s concessional 
lending
SOURCE: IMF, World Economic Outlook (WEO), October 2017.
Voting
power
no. % Inhab. (mill) % % USD bn % USD bn %
Advanced 35 19 1,023 14 59 44,118 59 47,276 41
Emerging 84 44 5,075 71 36 29,018 39 64,678 56
Low-income 70 37 1,102 15 5 1,175 2 3,154 3
TOTAL 189 100 7,200 100 100 74,311 100 115,108 100
GDP (2015)
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SOURCE: IMF.
6  The threshold currently stands at annual per capita income, measured by GNP, of $1,165 in 2018, according to 
the International Development Association (IDA) of the World Bank group.
7  The inclusion of Zimbabwe among these countries is subject to the adoption of the measures envisaged to settle 
its arrears with the IMF.
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harmonised with that of the International Development Association (IDA) of the World Bank 
group, and which is revised every two years in order to determine which members may 
acquire, maintain, forgo or regain concessional lending access status. More than 60% of 
the IMF’s concessional financing – whether in terms of the volume granted or of the number 
of programmes – is concentrated in sub-Saharan African countries (see Chart 2).
Since 1976, and more intensely so since 1986, the IMF has in practice been using the 
same concessional financial instrument under different names.8 What is involved, 
essentially, is a three-year credit facility with a fixed interest rate of 0.5% per annum, a 
grace period of 5½ years, a final maturity of 10 years as from the first drawdown, and 
standard conditionality, centred on the implementation of structural reforms geared to 
economic growth. This instrument has financed more than 250 programmes (see Chart 3), 
with an average duration of 36 months, an average approved volume of over 100 million 
Special Drawing Rights (SDRs), equivalent to 90% of the beneficiary country’s quota or to 
4% of its GDP, and an average drawdown around 75% of the volume granted.
The 2009 reform of the IMF’s concessional lending policy in response to the global financial 
crisis9 entailed, among other measures, the introduction of three credit facilities (see Table 
2) with similar names and characteristics to three facilities available in the IMF’s ordinary 
lending arrangements (see below); in particular, the Extended Credit Facility (ECF) replaced 
the existing facility, with a similar design, as the IMF’s main concessional instrument to 
counter prolonged balance of payments pressures. The Stand-by Credit Facility (SCF) was 
added to correct short-term external imbalances, respond to large exogenous shocks, and 
allow, for the first time in the framework of the concessional financing of the Fund, the 
CONCESSIONAL FINANCING BY GEOGRAPHICAL AREA (1986-2017) CHART 2
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27%
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SOURCE: IMF.
SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA ASIA AND OCEANIA LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE
8  Specifically, the following names: Trust Fund Facility, from 1976 to 1986; Structural Adjustment Facility (SAF), in 
1986; Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility (ESAF), from 1987 to 1999; Poverty Reduction and Growth 
Facility (PRGF), from 1999 to 2009; and Extended Credit Facility (ECF), as from 2009. The IMF also had a specific 
concessional facility in response to exogenous shocks from 2005 to 2009. For a more detailed analysis of the 
different facilities, see Box 2.
9  The IMF also reformed its non-concessional lending policy in 2009: it streamlined the conditionality of its 
programmes, it doubled the ceilings on access to ordinary resources, it simplified cost structures and maturities 
on the agreements, and it readjusted lending arrangements by introducing new facilities, making current facilities 
more flexible and eliminating others deemed obsolete.
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possibility of using the arrangement on a precautionary basis.10 The Rapid Credit Facility 
(RCF) emerged to provide immediate financing, on a small scale and with limited 
conditionality, in response to urgent balance of payment needs.
Use of the SCF and RCF has been modest since they became part of the IMF’s lending 
instruments (see Chart 4). From 2010 to 2017 a total of 10 programmes (for 7 countries) were 
approved for financing under the SCF, with an average duration of 18 months, and an average 
approved volume of around 125 million SDRs, equivalent on average to 80% of the quota or 
to 1% of the borrower’s GDP, and an average drawdown around 25% of the amount granted 
(60% if 6 precautionary programmes are excluded in which, moreover, there was no actual 
use of funds). Over the same period 28 disbursements (for 19 countries) were made under the 
RCF, in response to various natural disasters, risks of pandemics and other emergency 
situations, for an average amount of 25% of the beneficiary country’s quota.     
The 2009 reform also led to the blend of concessional and ordinary resources, in equal 
proportion, for those low-income countries with a relatively sounder position, better 
prospects of access to international financial markets and with expectations of soon being 
able to do without concessional financing. Blending is based on a system where the two 
financial facilities – concessional and ordinary – for a single country have a one-to-one 
relationship: the ECF is combined with the Extended Fund Facility (EFF); the SCF with the 
Stand-By Arrangement (SBA); and the RCF with the Rapid Financing Instrument (RFI). In 
2015, in the context of the adoption of the SDG, the IMF decided to double the proportion 
of ordinary resources.    
The blending policy, however, is not new.11 Until 2009, the IMF granted concessional and 
ordinary resources simultaneously to a single country in 25 different programmes. In 60% 
SOURCE: IMF.
a SAF (Structural Adjustment Facility).
 ESAF (Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility).
b PRGF (Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility).
c ECF (Extended Credit Facility).
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10  The precautionary use of an IMF arrangement implies the commitment of the authorities of the country not to request 
disbursements during the term of the arrangement. This commitment, which is not binding, is normally formulated at 
the approval of the agreement and is usually reiterated in successive reviews, but it may be the case that the authorities 
acquire it once the arrangement has been initiated, and even after having made some disbursements. 
11  Indeed, the low-income countries can, in addition to blending resources, also draw on ordinary financial 
resources in isolation, or in conjunction with concessional resources, albeit without simultaneous approval. 
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)FCR( ytilicaF tiderC dipaR)FCS( ytilicaF tiderC ybdnatS)FCE( ytilicaF tiderC dednetxE
Purpose
Medium- and long-term concessional financing for 
countries with actual (current or prospective) and 
prolonged balance of payments problems, with an 
expected resolution period normally equal to or 
greater than 3 years (greater than 2 years, in any 
event)
Short-term concessional financing for countries 
with actual or potential balance of payments 
problems, with a resolution period normally 
expected to be less than 2 years
3 years, extendible up to 5 years. 
Unlimited number of successive agreements
1-2 years as from approval of the agreement. 
Possibility of several renewals (2 ½) in a period of 5 
years
Indeterminate. Possibility of 
repeated use 
Normal
Exceptional
Not necessary or not feasible. 
Specification of prior actions only 
under exceptional circumstances 
 gnirotinom resolc fi ylretrauq( snoisiver ylraey-flaHyllamron ,snoisiver ylraey-flah 6
is required) 
Not foreseen
7 half-yearly disbursements, normally. Does not 
necessarily replicate the projected course of balance 
of payments needs
Half-yearly (quarterly) disbursements, the first of 
which upon approval of the agreement. Usually 
adapted to the projected course of balance of 
payments needs. 
A single disbursement, or several 
over a limited period (in these 
cases, normally to smooth 
transition to an ECF agreement)
SDR rate < 2%               0.00% SDR rate ≤ 0.75%           0.00%
2% ≤ SDR rate ≤ 5%       0.25% 0.75% < SDR rate < 2%  0.25% 0%
SDR rate > 5%               0.50% 2% ≤ SDR rate ≤ 5%        0.50%
SDR rate > 5%                0.75%
sraey 01sraey 8sraey 01ytirutaM
Grace period 5 ½ years from first drawdown of funds 4 years from first drawdown of funds 5 ½ years from first drawdown of 
funds
Repayment 10 equal half-yearly instalments, after the grace 
period
9 equal half-yearly instalments, after the grace 
period
10 equal half-yearly instalments, 
after the grace period
FCS-FCEFCE)ISP( tnemurtsnI troppuS yciloP–FCSytilibitapmocnI
Extended Fund Facility (EFF)-SBA, occasionally Standby Arrangement (SBA)–EFF occasionally Rapid Facility Instrument (RFI)
Private
creditors
IMF
Not required
Access
Conditionality
Disbursements
Objective
Duration
Reviews
Possibility of unifying consecutive revisions. Exemptions regime in observing or complying with conditions 
Immediate disbursements for 
countries with pressing balance of 
payments problems owing to 
exogenous shocks, natural 
disasters, emergence from armed 
conflict, national instability, states of 
emergency and fragility
Interest rate Cost referenced to the interest rate on SDRs and subject to two-year revisions by the IMF Executive Board. Half-yearly settlement. 0% per 
annum at least until December 2018
Precautionary use
Blended PRGT–General 
Resources Account (GRA) 
financing
Characteristics
To provide for a stable and sustainable macroeconomic position that is consistent with poverty-reduction and sound and durable growth
Direct or indirect financing of deficits allowed, insofar as there is pressure on the balance of payments 
 larutan rojam %06( %5.73atouq evitalumuc %522  -  atouq launna %57
disasters) annual quota – 75% 
cumulative quota100% annual quota  -  300% cumulative quota
Standard ex post rate. Quantitiative objectives and structural measures reasonably under the direct or 
indirect control of the economic authorities, of critical importance for the achievement of the programme's 
goals and necessary for the implementation of the provisions and policies envisaged under the IMF 
Articles of Agreement. Instruments: prior actions, quantitative performance criteria, indicative goals and 
structural benchmarks
Not envisaged. Approval of an ECF agreement for a 
small amount recommended
Envisaged. Annualised access of 50% quota, to be 
increased if balance of payments need 
materialised. Commission of 0.15% per annum for 
half-yearly drawdown of funds 
Not envisaged
1:2 distribution between PRGT – GRA resources wtih a "ceiling" on PRGT resources subject to the concessional access rules and, as from this 
"ceiling", GRA resources
Possibility of a first (frontloaded) or final (backloaded) sizable disburesement. Amendment of the drawdowns calendar
Poverty Reduction Strategy 
(PRS)
Alignment of the programme with the poverty-reduction and growth strategy led by the country, with the protection of social spending and 
other similar spending priorities, documented in an Economic Development Document (EDD) 
Arrears with The IMF's Lending into Arrears (LiA) policy is applicable. IMF financing if its support is considered essential and the country strives in good faith 
to reach collaboration agreements with its creditors
Analysis usually prepared jointly by the IMF and the World Bank
Financial guarantees Approval and reviews subject to financing commitments by other official and private creditors, 
and verification of the country's capacity to meet its financial obligations with the IMF
Staggering of measures: notification of the Board, loss of PRGT eligibility, statement of lack of cooperation, suspension of technical assistance, 
suspension voting and representation rights, and compulsory withdrawal.
Debt Sustainability Analysis 
(DSA)
MAIN CHARACTERISTICS OF IMF CONCESSIONAL FINANCING FACILITIES TABLE 2
SOURCE: IMF.
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of the cases, approval of the concessional facility was combined with an SBA, and the 
remaining 40% with an EFF. The average volume granted under the concessional facilities 
was of the order of half the lending approved jointly, while the average volume drawn down 
on these concessional facilities was always greater than that relating to the ordinary 
facilities, as might be expected in the case of less onerous resources.12 
As from 2010, with the new map of concessional instruments, the landscape has changed: 
3 programmes have blended ECF and EFF resources, 5 programmes have blended SCF 
and SBA resources, and 2 countries have received blended RCF and RFI emergency 
assistance. Under the decision adopted in 2015, the proportion of resources granted 
through EFF and SBA agreements has increased to the extent of doubling the weight of 
the ECF and SCF. Also, in 4 programmes (3 countries) the precautionary financing afforded 
by the two Stand-by windows was blended. 
The 2009 reform also influenced the interest rate applied. The fixed rate of 0.5% per annum 
was replaced by a specific scale of rates for each credit facility, with tranches based on the 
SOURCE: IMF.
a SCF (Stand-by Credit Facility).
b RCF (Rapid Credit Facility).
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 %57.052.00 ≤ SDR rate < 2% 0.25
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57.0%5 > etar RDS57.05.0
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2009
0
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61025102
SCF
0
RCFSCFECF/RCF
TABLE 3
SOURCE: IMF.
12  IMF ordinary financing generally applies a fixed charge (100 bp at present) to the interest rate on SDRs and 
surcharges for high and prolonged use of the credit (200 bp if the outstanding credit exceeds 187.5% of the 
quota, and an additional 100 bp if this situation is prolonged for over 36 months).    
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level of the interest rate on SDRs, and revisable every two years13 (see Table 3). The 
adopted mechanism seeks to counter the loss of concessionality of IMF financing in an 
international context of significantly low interest rates14, to preserve financial resources 
and to adapt the terms of the financing to the specific needs and  circumstances of the 
beneficiary countries.
The trust fund that channels the IMF’s concessional financing is called the Poverty 
Reduction and Growth Trust (PRGT). It is managed by the IMF and mainly financed through 
voluntary contributions by Governments, central banks and other official financial 
institutions, and through financial resources from the IMF itself. In balance sheet terms, the 
PRGT is separated from the rest of the IMF’s financial resources15 and is structured in 
three major accounts: loan, subsidy and reserves. 
The loan account raises bilateral resources, in SDRs16 or other currencies, at market 
interest rates17 and grants concessional loans to low-income countries. The lenders’ 
schedule for drawings and repayments is associated with the disbursements and 
reimbursements of end-borrowers. The total contributions to the account since the 
creation of the trust fund amount to 37.6 billion SDRs, of which around 21 billion relate to 
financing agreements in force. Central banks and Governments account for close to 68% 
of the contributions to this account18 (see Chart 5). 
Structure and functioning 
of the PRGT trust fund
PARTICIPATION IN THE PRGT LOAN ACCOUNT BY TYPE OF AGENCY (1998-2018)
9.5 (6.7)
0.2 (3.3)
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OFFICAL DEVELOPMENT AGENCIES
MULTILATERAL FUNDS
22.5 (11.7)
32.2 (25.0)
35.6 (53.3)
SOURCE: IMF.
CHART 5
Amount committed (no. of agreements) as a %
13  In 2015 the IMF eliminated the interest rate on the RCF permanently and, one year later, it split the first tranche 
of the SCF so that this facility might also benefit from a zero rate. The mechanism, however, is still to be applied 
and will remain suspended until 2018 at least.  Meantime, a common zero rate is exceptionally applied for all 
concessional facilities.
14  In response to this downtrend, the interest rate on SDRs, a stable, market rate applicable to the IMF’s ordinary 
financing, has had a floor of 0.05% per annum since October 2014. 
15  This division is because the Articles of Agreement do not allow the cost of the financing of the IMF’s general 
resources to vary in terms of its members’ levels of income. Any amendment to the Fund’s statutes requires the 
favourable vote of three-fifths of the members representing 85% of the total voting power.  
16  From the standpoint of the lender country, SDR contributions pose a problem in that they require conversion to 
another currency, in a narrow and relatively illiquid market, in which there are few participants prepared to 
voluntarily act as a counterparty.  
17  Remuneration policy draws a distinction on the basis of the currency with which drawings are made: 
remuneration is at the SDR interest rate when disbursements are with SDRs or at an interest rate derived 
therefrom if disbursements are with other currencies. The derived rate has the same composition as the basket 
of SDRs, but with a final maturity of six rather than three months so as to thereby encourage contributions for 
lending in currencies other than SDRs. 
18  The Banco de España has participated since 1978 in the financing of this account on five occasions. The 
amount committed to the PRGT currently amounts to 855 million SDRs, concluding in December 2024. 
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The subsidy account covers the difference in interest rates between the market 
remuneration the official creditors receive and the interest rate borne by debtors. This 
account receives bilateral contributions in the form of donations, deposits and investments, 
and IMF resources originating in gold sales made in the 1970s. The bilateral contributions 
amount to 2.2 billion SDRs from 43 countries, mainly from national Treasuries. 
Finally, the reserve account accumulates resources from the gains obtained on IMF gold 
sales that gave rise to the original trust fund, and from the investment income generated 
by such resources. The account, therefore, does not draw on external contributions and 
is intended to prevent loan arrears and default risks and to cover the administrative 
expenses of the trust fund. The current balance stands at 4 billion SDRs, approximately, 
and the coverage rate of the account, on average, represents 60.5% of the outstanding 
credit (see Chart 6).
The IMF has stated on several occasions its aim that the trust fund be self-sustained in the 
medium term, i.e. that the resources accumulated in the reserve account suffice to cater 
also for the subsidising of the credits, without additional contributions having to be made 
in the subsidy account. The achievement of this aim is based on a self-sustainability 
strategy finally formalised in 2012, which foresees an annual average lending capacity of 
1.25 billion SDRs over two decades, the implementation of contingent measures when 
financing needs exceed the foregoing average,19 and the presumption that the changes 
that affect concessional credit facilities in the future will be consistent with the self-
sustainability of the trust fund.
The distinctive features of the IMF’s concessional financing compared with other sources 
of development assistance involve, according to the institution itself,20 promoting 
macroeconomic stability, facilitating the temporary absorption of other aid, resolving and 
preventing crises, tempering macroeconomic volatility with a lesser fiscal and balance of 
payments-related impact, signalling the satisfactory implementation of reforms by the 
country, and catalysing resources provided by other donors for development. 
A summary assessment of 
the IMF’s concessional 
lending policy 
SOURCE: IMF.
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CHART 6PRGT RESERVE ACCOUNT (1988-2017)
19  Raising of ad hoc resources, use of profits on sales of IMF gold holdings, and temporary suspension of the 
reimbursement of the PRGT’s administrative costs covered with resources drawn from the IMF’s own funds. 
20  See IMF (2009a). 
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The IMF has an extensive and, generally, positive experience in financing low-income 
countries both in concessional and, to a lesser extent, ordinary or market terms. The IMF’s 
financial role in this area has been based on the promotion of the development of its most 
vulnerable members by means of economic programmes increasingly focused on the 
Fund’s areas of specialisation21, with a clear signalling intention – both to attract more 
substantial financial resources under even more favourable conditions from other 
institutions for development22, as well as to ease the forgiveness of these countries’ debt 
by the international financial community – and supported by conditionality that is 
progressively led by the poverty-reduction strategies of the countries themselves. 
Set against these elements, other more questionable aspects may be identified. One 
recurring concern of the IMF is to prevent, as far as possible, its members from excessively 
prolonging the use of its financial resources (ordinary and concessional alike) by linking up 
different programmes.23 Behind this concern is the aim of accelerating crisis prevention 
and crisis resolution and, against a background of limited resources, of not hampering the 
access to funds by other countries. 
The low-income countries are a good example of the tendency to perpetuate IMF financing. 
The prolonged use of IMF resources was assessed by its Independent Evaluation Office 
(IEO) in 2002. The analysis evidenced the fact that the low-income countries and, to a 
lesser extent, the countries in transition towards market economies made up the majority 
of the prolonged-user group. The lag between the long-term objectives of the programmes 
and the short-term tools available, the perception that the IMF’s financial resources would 
be permanently available, weak implementation capacity on the part of the countries and 
the absence of leadership and commitment by national authorities to the programmes 
were the main determinants of this situation. 
In response to this evaluation, the IMF placed emphasis on improving the design of the 
programmes and on boosting borrowers’ “ownership” thereof – aspects which were also 
included in the revised guidelines on conditionality that were being developed in parallel 
– rather than on introducing measures to reduce the use of their resources.24 The updated 
2013 IEO report confirmed that prolonged use of these loans was concentrated in a 
relatively small group of low-income countries, substantiating the 2002 conclusions and 
recommendations.25
Moreover, the separation of the PRGT trust fund from the rest of the IMF’s accounts 
raises  some questions. Quotas play an essential role in the functioning of the Fund. The 
21  The literature on the macroeconomic effects of the IMF’s programmes, including those for low-income countries, 
is extensive, and its results differ in terms of the variables examined, the sample of programmes selected and 
the methodology adopted. For the subject at hand, see, for example, the assessments by Schadler  (1993), 
Botchwey  (1998) and IMF (1998) on the programmes financed by the ESAF facility, those of the IEO (2004 and 
2014) on the programmes financed through the PRGF, and those of Mumssen  (2013) and Bird and Rowlands 
(2017) in reference to the ESAF -PRGF -PRGT facilities during the 1986-2010 period. 
22  The literature of the catalytic effect of IMF programs is extensive and does not yield conclusive empirical 
evidence. Some of the works collected in the review of Bird (2007) point to a greater effect in the case of official 
bilateral aid flows to low-income countries with respect to other capital flows to emerging economies.  
23  Within the IMF, a country is deemed to maintain a prolonged financial relationship with the institution when it 
consecutively has programmes financed with IMF resources for a period of 7 or more years within a 10-year period.
24  The possibility of penalising the prolonged use of resources with a higher interest rate, for instance, was 
rejected in the past since it was considered inappropriate for low-income countries, which are highly dependent 
on concessional financing. 
25  Bal Gunduz  (2013), from a different perspective, find evidence that both the low-income countries’ commitment 
to the IMF in the long term (at least 5 years per decade) and their short-term involvement, associated with the 
drawdown of resources in response to exogenous shocks, have a beneficial effect on economic growth.   
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quota of each IMF member is based mainly on its relative position in the world economy. 
Among other functions, the quotas determine the maximum financial commitment to the 
Fund and regular access to its financing. The contributions to the PRGT, however, are 
voluntary and generally independent of the relative size of the contributing country, while 
the volume of concessional financing that a low-income country receives is indeed on the 
basis of its IMF quota. 
It is for the Executive Board, upon management’s proposal, to approve programmes 
financed with PRGT loans and the periodic revision of these programmes, under which 
disbursements of the successive committed tranches are made. This decision-making 
procedure involves all the members of the IMF, whether or not they contribute to the PRGT. 
In short, the asymmetry between debtors and creditors in the instrumentation of the quota, 
on one hand, and the asymmetry between the creditors themselves in the decision-making 
process, on the other, evidence a governance deficit in the management of the IMF’s 
concessional lending. 
The review scheduled for 2018 will, among other aspects, examine the procedures for the 
use of the various concessional facilities; the differences in objectives and terms among 
the Fund’s concessional and ordinary facilities and the extent to which these differences 
hamper combined financing; the effectiveness of programmes in terms of economic 
growth and poverty-reduction; and the degree to which access policy enables the financing 
requirements of these countries to be reconciled with the safeguarding of what are scarce 
concessional resources.
The review is expected to raise possible adjustments to several aspects of concessional 
financing, such as access limits and norms and related policies (augmentations and 
extensions of the agreements), the interest rates on credit facilities, the precautionary use 
of concessional financing, financial assistance in response to natural disasters and 
situations of extreme fragility, and the continuity of the non-financial programmes available 
to these countries (see Box 1), given that the Fund has had non-financial programmes in 
place for this purpose, available for all its members, since 2017.
The positions within the IMF ahead of this debate range between advocates of increasing 
loan volumes, making concessional financing cheaper and extending maturities, and those 
who show concern over the renewed external over-indebtedness of the low-income 
countries (an issue that will also be given priority during 2018, in the G-20 working group 
on international financial architecture) and who place the self-sustainability of the PRGT 
subsidy system, in the terms envisaged by the institution, ahead of other options. Against 
this background, there is room to explore options aimed at a progressive integration of 
PRGT credit into the IMF’s general lending policy, that which is financed through the 
quotas and the indebtedness with some of its members, as the bulk of the low-income 
countries progressively strengthen their economic situation.        
As indicated, the low-income countries have not only financed their programmes with the 
IMF through concessional resources, but, on some occasions, they have also blended 
concessional and ordinary funds and, on others, they have used solely ordinary resources. 
The 2009 reform and the latest developments provide, among other measures, for a 
blending policy better adapted to the specific circumstances of the potential applicants 
and for a clearer application framework, which makes it more attractive and encourages 
its use. One option is that low-income countries whose situation allows them to blend both 
types of resources may opt between incurring debt under the current blending policy or, 
Towards a progressive 
consolidation of IMF loans 
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alternatively, doing so only with concessional resources, but assuming dearer credit – 
through interest rates surcharges – to the point that both forms of indebtedness prove 
financially equivalent. This solution, which would also make the concessional financing 
policy more flexible, would enable the IMF to generate additional funds for concessional 
financing, in a context of scarce resources26, while the countries that were to adopt it could 
adjust the credit in its entirety to the profile of the concessional facility’s disbursements 
and repayments.  
The IMF, on the other hand, has added new concessional lending instruments, in an 
attempt to offer a broader and, at the same time, more granulated range of financial 
facilities better adapted to the specific characteristics of the countries comprising this 
group. The resulting catalogue of facilities closely and openly matches much of the map of 
the Fund’s non-concessional financial instruments. It is too premature to consider full 
equivalence between both forms of credit, since the low-income countries taken as a 
whole are not yet in a position to discard the concessional financial assistance offered by 
the IMF. That, however, does not prevent longer-term proposals along these lines from 
being raised. 
The substantial agreement over the design and characteristics of the IMF’s concessional 
and ordinary instruments opens the way to considering the consolidation of all the financial 
facilities in the IMF’s financial structure, without compromising or interrupting the provision 
of concessional lending. Moving the concessional facilities would entail switching the 
raising of new loanable resources to the area of the quotas, as occurs with the bulk of the 
financing provided by the IMF, and trusting in the continuity of the current self-financing 
regime for subsidies.27 This solution would not confer on the Fund a different role to that it 
has been performing with the low-income countries: there would be no grounds for 
reducing this role, as might be inferred from the elimination or slimming-down of the PRGT, 
or for boosting it, as a result of the mobilisation of loanable resources through the IMF’s 
natural channels. The main consequence would be a simplification of the Fund’s lending 
policy, making it more consistent, for all purposes, with the quota-based functioning of the 
institution, as acknowledged by most of its members. 
31.5.2018.
BIRD, G. (2007). The IMF: A Bird’s Eye View of its Role and Operations. Discussion Papers in Economics. DP 04/07. 
University of Surrey. 
BIRD, G., and D. ROWLANDS (2017). “The Effect of IMF Programmes on Economic Growth in Low Income Countries: 
An Empirical Analysis”. The Journal of Development Studies, vol. 53. no. 12.
BOTCHWEY, K., P. COLLIER, J. W. GUNNING and K. HAMADA (1998). External Evaluation of the ESAF. Report by a 
Group of Independent Experts, IMF, June.
BOUGHTON, J. M. (2001). Silent Revolution: the International Monetary Fund, 1979-1989, IMF.
— (2012). Tearing down walls: the International Monetary Fund, 1990-1999, IMF.
IMF (1987- 2015). Instrument to Establish the Poverty Reduction and Growth Trust, December- July.
— (1998). The ESAF at Ten Years. Economic Adjustments and Reform in Low-Income Countries, February.
— (2004). The role of the Fund in Low-Income Member Countries, August.
— (2008). The role of the Fund in Low-Income Countries, June. 
REFERENCES 
26  A greater use of concessional resources would raise the demand for these loans above the levels that allow the 
self-sustainability of the PRGT, while imposing surcharges on the interest rate would reduce the need for 
subsidies. 
27  In fact, the elements on which the self-sustainability of the PRGT rests also substantiate this solution. If this strategy 
could not ultimately be pursued, the raising of resources for subsidy might benefit from setting in place a regular 
fund replenishment system, such as that of the IDA at the World Bank, which is currently absent at the IMF.
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 12 ECONOMIC BULLETIN THE IMF’S CONCESSIONAL LENDING POLICY: SITUATION AND OUTLOOK
— (2009a). The Fund’s Facilities and Financing Framework for Low-Income Countries, February.
— (2009b). A New Architecture of Facilities for Low-Income Countries and Reform of the Fund’s Concessional 
Financing Framework, June.
— (2015). Financing for Development - Enhancing the Financial Safety Net for Developing Countries, June.
— (2016). Poverty Reduction and Growth Trust—Review of Interest Rate Structure, October.  
— (2017a). Update on the financing of the Fund’s concessional assistance and debt relief to low-income countries, 
April.
— (2017b). Eligibility to use the Fund’s facilities for concessional financing, May.
— (2017c). Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative and Multilateral Debt Reduction Initiative (MDRI) - 
Statistical Update, September.
— (2017d). World Economic Outlook database, October.  
GARRIDO, I., P. MORENO and X. SERRA (2016). “The new map of international financial institutions”, Economic 
Bulletin, January, Banco de España.
GARRITSEN DE VRIES, M. (1986). Cooperation on Trial. The International Monetary Fund: 1972-1978, IMF.
IEO (2002). Evaluation of prolonged use of IMF resources, IMF.
— (2004). The IMF’s Role in Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs) and the Poverty Reduction and Growth 
Facility (PRGT), IMF.
— (2013). Prolonged use of IMF resources. Revisiting the 2002 Evaluation, IMF.
— (2014). Revisiting the IEO Evaluations of the IMF’s Role in PRSPs and the PRGF (2004) and the IMF and Aid to 
Sub-Saharan Africa (2007), IMF.
LOMBARDI, D. (2005). The IMF’s Role in Low-Income Countries: Issues and Challenges, IMF Working Paper, 
WP/05/177, IMF. 
MELTZER REPORT (2000). Report of the International Institution Advisory Commission, US Government Printing 
Office, Washington DC.
MUMSSEN, C., Y. BAL GUNDUZ, C. EBEKE and L. KALTANI (2013). IMF-Supported Programs in Low Income 
Countries: Economic Impact over the Short and Longer Term, IMF Working Paper, WP/13/273. IMF, December.
SCHADLER, S., F. ROZWADOWSKI, S. TIWARI  and D. O. ROBINSON (1993). Economic Adjustment in Low-Income 
Countries. Experience under the Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility.
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 13 ECONOMIC BULLETIN THE IMF’S CONCESSIONAL LENDING POLICY: SITUATION AND OUTLOOK
BOX 1 OTHER IMF FUNCTIONS RELATED TO LOW-INCOME COUNTRIES: THE HIPC INITIATIVE AND THE PSI 
INSTRUMENT
In addition to concessional loans, which are the focal point of this 
article, the IMF performs other functions aimed specifically at the 
low-income countries. 
The application of an IMF-financed programme is, generally, a 
prerequisite for sovereign debt restructuring within the Paris Club. 
In 1996, the Fund and the World Bank, through the Heavily 
Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) initiative, decided to spearhead 
the efforts of the international financial community (comprising 
multilateral institutions, governments – inside and outside the 
Paris Club alike – and private creditors) to reduce the external debt 
burden of the most indebted poor countries to sustainable levels.1 
The HIPC initiative, which was strengthened in 1999 and 
multilateralised even further in 2005, involved a two-stage process, 
separated by an intermediate stage known as the decision point, 
where the concessional financing of both institutions played a 
central role in enabling the conclusion of this process and 
completing all the debt relief that the various creditors had 
committed to, including the two Bretton Woods institutions, at the 
so-called culmination point. With all its upsides and downsides, 
the initiative has played a key part in the IMF’s granting of 
concessional lending to these countries since 1996. Now reaching 
its conclusion (36 countries have completed it while 4 more might 
still embark on it), the process entailed an approximate relief-
related cost of $77 billion in current value terms as at end-2015. 
The Policy Support Instrument (PSI), created in 2005, is a non-
financial programme conceived for low-income countries that do not 
need – or want – the IMF’s financial assistance. Its objective is to 
offer a reinforced surveillance tool in the form of a programme 
subject normally to half-yearly assessments and geared to promoting 
dialogue with the Fund and to delivering clear signals to donors, 
creditors and the general public about the adoption of IMF-backed 
economic  policies. A PSI may be approved for a duration of one to 
four years (with a maximum of five years) and may be rolled over as 
long as the country remains in the same situation. Since its creation, 
approvals have been authorised on 18 occasions to 7 countries, all 
of them from sub-Saharan Africa. The PSI has enabled the economic 
stability of user countries to be consolidated, with a considerable 
degree of compliance with the programmes (greater in the case of 
quantitative conditions than in that of structural reforms), despite the 
absence of financing. In 2018 the Fund will examine the possibility of 
replacing this instrument with an analogous one, namely the Policy 
Coordination Instrument (PCI), available to all members – irrespective 
of their level of income – as from 2017. 
1  Some 40 low-income countries, qualifying to receive financing under the 
Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility (ESAF), and unable at that time 
to meet their debt service by means of export revenue and capital 
inflows, mainly.
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BOX 2 THE IMF AND THE LOW-INCOME COUNTRIES. OVER THREE DECADES’ PARTICIPATION IN DEVELOPMENT 
FINANCING. TIMELINE.1
August 1975. The IMF created the Oil Facility Subsidy Account 
(OFSA), drawing on contributions from the oil-exporting and 
industrialised countries, to subsidise the cost of this credit facility 
for those developing countries most severely affected by the rise 
in oil and oil derivatives prices according to the United Nations 
Secretariat General. 
May 1976. The IMF established the Trust Fund to provide financial 
assistance with which to support the balance of payments of the 
developing countries, with the profits from the sale of 25 million 
fine ounces of its gold holdings. 
October 1985. The IMF Interim Committee agreed to grant 
concessional financing to the low-income members totalling 
2.7 billion SDRs with the expected Trust Fund reflows during the 
1985-1991 period. 
March 1986. The IMF created the Structural Adjustment Facility 
(SAF), and the trust fund of the same name, for the purpose 
envisaged by the Interim Committee. It was agreed that the list of 
the countries that could avail themselves of this assistance would 
coincide with that of the countries eligible to receive financing 
from the IDA, albeit without acknowledging any formal or automatic 
link between both lists. 
December 1987. The IMF replaced the SAF with the Enhanced 
Structural Adjustment Facility (ESAF), to finance macroeconomic 
and structural programmes lasting three years, sounder than the 
previous programmes and aimed at adjusting the external 
imbalances and boosting the growth of the low-income countries. 
March 1989. The IMF and the World Bank, in response to concern 
about the overlapping of functions between both institutions and 
cross-conditionality, signed a collaboration agreement, known as 
Concordat. 
September 1996. The IMF Interim Committee and the World Bank 
Development Committee jointly adopted the Heavily Indebted 
Poor Countries Initiative (HIPC) with the aim of reducing to 
sustainable levels the external debt burden of the countries eligible 
to join the initiative. 
September 1999. The IMF and the World Bank strengthened the 
HIPC initiative to accelerate, extend and deepen debt relief, linking 
it more closely to poverty-reduction. Moreover, the IMF adopted a 
resolution to conduct an exceptional and one-time off-market sale 
of up to 14 million fine ounces of gold, as part of a package 
enabling the financing of the Fund’s participation in the enhanced 
HIPC initiative. 
November 1999. The ESAF was re-named the Poverty Reduction 
and Growth Facility (PRGF). Its aim is to boost durable growth, 
raise standards of living and reduce poverty, pursuant to strategies 
led by the economic authorities of the country and documented in 
a Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP). 
December 1999 and April 2000. The IMF conducted seven off-
market gold transactions with Mexico and Brazil for a total amount 
of close to 13 million fine ounces. The Fund sold gold to these 
countries and, at the same time, accepted their return at the same 
price as settlement for the obligations incurred by these countries 
with the IMF. As a result of the transaction, the Fund’s physical 
holdings of gold remained unchanged, while it recognised a capital 
gain earmarked for financing its contribution to the debt relief 
envisaged under the HIPC initiative. 
September 2000. The United Nations General Assembly adopted 
the Millennium Declaration. This document included eight major 
goals relating to the eradication of poverty, universal primary 
education, gender equality, infant and maternal mortality, HIV/
AIDS and the conservation of the environment, to be met by the 
2015 time horizon.  
May 2001. The IMF opened an administered account to raise 
resources, drawn from voluntary bilateral contributions, intended 
to subsidise the interest on Emergency Post-Conflict Assistance 
(EPCA), for PRGF-eligible countries in a post-war situation. 
March 2002. Under the aegis of the UNO, various governments, 
the World Bank, the IMF and other multilateral agencies signed the 
Monterrey Consensus on Financing for development in Mexico. 
January 2005. The IMF extended the EPCA interest rate subsidy to 
the Emergency Natural Disasters Assistance (ENDA), for PRGF 
countries affected by natural disasters. 
April 2004. The IMF established the Trade Integration Mechanism 
(TIM) to help member countries to overcome temporary balance of 
payments pressures resulting from growing trade liberalisation. 
September 2005. The International Monetary and Financial 
Committee (IMFC), the new name for the Interim Committee as 
from 1999, and the Development Committee reached an 
agreement to forgive 100% of HIPC-eligible countries’ debt with 
the IMF, the World Bank and the African Development Fund 
(ADF) under the Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative (MDRI) 
promoted by the G-8.
October 2005. The IMF adopted the non-financial Policy Support 
Instrument (PSI) programmes conceived for low-income countries 
that do not want, or need, IMF financing, but which are pursuing 
institutional assessment and backing of their policies. 
1  A detailed analysis of the history of the IMF during the 1972-1978 and 
1979-1999 periods, from the perspective of the institution itself, can be 
found in Garritsen De Vries (1986) and Boughton (2001 y 2011), respectively.
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BOX 2 THE IMF AND THE LOW-INCOME COUNTRIES. OVER THREE DECADES’ PARTICIPATION IN DEVELOPMENT 
FINANCING. TIMELINE (cont’d)
November 2005. The IMF established the Exogenous Shocks 
Facility (ESF), within the PRGF trust fund, whose name changed to 
PRGF-ESF trust fund. The ESF was to provide concessional 
financing to low-income countries undergoing exogenous shocks, 
such as adverse changes in commodities prices, natural disasters, 
conflict and crisis with neighbouring countries, etc. 
September 2008. The IMF split access under the ESF into two 
components: a rapid disbursement window and a high access 
window. 
July 2009. The IMF overhauled its concessional financing, 
making it more flexible and adapting it to the needs of the low-
income countries. Three new facilities – the Extended/Stand-by/
Rapid Credit Facility (ECF, SCF and RCF) – replaced those 
hitherto in place, a new interest rate-setting mechanism was 
introduced for each facility on the basis of the SDR rate, the 
policy whereby concessional and ordinary resources are blended 
for a single country was reinforced, and the PRGF trust fund was 
adapted to the new facilities and changed its name to Poverty 
Reduction and Growth Trust (PRGT). In acknowledgment of the 
global crisis, and exceptionally, the annual interest rate for the 
three PRGT facilities was set at 0% to December 2011, initially, 
and, after successive extensions in 2012, 2014 and 2016, to 
December 2018. 
June 2010. The IMF created the Post-Catastrophe Debt Relief 
(PCDR) trust fund, to enable its participation in international debt 
relief in favour of poor countries affected by catastrophic natural 
disasters, as was the case with the Haiti earthquake in January 
that year. 
December 2010. The IMF concluded a programme involving the 
partial sale of its gold holdings. Profits amounted to 6.85 billion 
SDRs, 4.4 billion of which were earmarked to obtain investment 
income with which to supplement the Fund’s ordinary revenue, 
and the remainder, to finance the PRGT subsidy account. The 
distribution of profits to this end concluded in 2013. 
November 2011. Under the IMF’s ordinary financing, the Rapid 
Financing Instrument (RFI) was introduced to respond to pressing 
balance of payments needs. This instrument replaced ENDA and 
EPCA assistance. 
September 2012. The IMF approved a framework ensuring the 
self-sustained functioning of the PRGT subsidy whereby, in the 
medium term, the reserve account – in addition to covering loan 
arrears and default risks – would cover the interest rate subsidy 
and the administrative charges of the trust fund, once the 
resources accumulated in the subsidy account were exhausted. 
February 2015. The IMF created the Catastrophe Containment 
and Relief Trust (CCRT) fund, for the relief of debt incurred with the 
IMF by low-income countries affected by multiple catastrophes. 
The CCRT replaced the PCDR, and its initial endowment stemmed 
from the latter and from the extinct MDRI trust fund. 
June and July 2015. The PRSP framework was simplified. The IMF 
increased access to PRGT resources by 50%, it doubled the 
volume of non-concessional resources in the mix of PRGT and 
ordinary resources, placing it at a proportion of 1/3-2/3, 
respectively, it brought access under the RFI onto an equal footing 
with that of the RCF, and it set the interest rate on the RCF at 0% 
per annum permanently, irrespective of the level of the interest rate 
on SDRs.   
September 2015. The United Nations General Assembly adopted 
the SDG or 2030 Agenda.
October and November 2016. The IMF lowered the cost of 
financing of the SCF, it clarified the blending policy in force, the 
rules for access to IMF resources, and the precautionary financial 
assistance that low income countries can receive.  
May 2017. The IMF raised the annual ceiling on access to the RCF 
and RFI financial assistance available for countries affected by a 
large-scale natural disaster.
